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Abstract. Research on next-generation 5G wireless networks is cur-
rently attracting a lot of attention in both academia and industry. While
5G development and standardization activities are still at their early
stage, it is widely acknowledged that 5G systems are going to extensively
rely on dense small cell deployments, which would exploit infrastructure
and network functions virtualization (NFV), and push the network intel-
ligence towards network edges by embracing the concept of mobile edge
computing (MEC). As security will be a fundamental enabling factor
of small cell as a service (SCaaS) in 5G networks, we present the most
prominent threats and vulnerabilities against a broad range of targets. As
far as the related work is concerned, to the best of our knowledge, this
paper is the ﬁrst to investigate security challenges at the intersection of
SCaaS, NFV, and MEC. It is also the ﬁrst paper that proposes a set
of criteria to facilitate a clear and eﬀective taxonomy of security chal-
lenges of main elements of 5G networks. Our analysis can serve as a
staring point towards the development of appropriate 5G security solu-
tions. These will have crucial eﬀect on legal and regulatory frameworks
as well as on decisions of businesses, governments, and end-users.
Keywords: Security, small cell as a service, network functions virtual-
ization, mobile edge computing, 5G.
1 Introduction
Rapid advances in the industry of handheld devices and mobile applications has
fuelled the penetration of interactive and ubiquitous web-based services into al-
most every aspect of our lives. At the same time, users expect almost zero-delay
and inﬁnite-capacity experience. However, current 4G technologies reveal their
inherent limitations, as discussed in [1]. This is true, for both human-to-human
and machine-to-machine (M2M) communications [2, 3]. Both will require radi-
cally diﬀerent architectural design, network protocols, and business models. To
achieve that, researchers are working towards the next-generation 5G wireless
networks aiming to oﬀer high-speed and personalized services to both humans
and machines, when and where needed [4].
To support highly dense areas where a vast number of users want to access the
network infrastructure, deployment of small cells (SCs) is envisioned. These can
co-operate with traditional macro cells, to provide high levels of user experience
[5, 6]. SCs will play a signiﬁcant role in 5G networks, which are expected to
be highly heterogeneous. That is, future 5G networks will comprise a variety of
collocated resources, such as indoor and outdoor SCs, macro cell sites, and WiFi
access points. Another driving force in 5G will be the advances in hardware
virtualization technologies, which can facilitate the realization of the small cell
as a service (SCaaS) concept [7].
The primary beneﬁt that comes with SCaaS is that independent actors
own and lease their cellular infrastructure to multiple mobile network operators
(MNOs); therefore SCaaS provides a natural multi-tenant support, by allowing
each MNO to be a tenant of the infrastructure and getting a slice of the phys-
ical SC infrastructure [8]. This is not the only advantage that SCaaS can oﬀer
to 5G. We can leverage SCaaS to provide high-speed, low-latency communica-
tions, and to ooad the mobile core network traﬃc and computation to the
network edge, giving life to the concept of mobile edge computing (MEC) and
fog computing, which has recently attained attention [911].
Finally, another important technology of 5G is network function virtualiza-
tion (NFV), which: decouples network functions from their physical location;
oﬀers ﬂexible function migration; and distributes functions across diﬀerent net-
work components [12, 13]. It is worth mentioning that NFV can be further en-
hanced with the concept of software-deﬁned networking (SDN) decoupling the
control plane from the data plane [14,15].
Although 5G network technologies are still taking shape, and standardiza-
tion activities are still ongoing, it is expected that SCaaS, MEC, NFV, and SDN
are going to be integral parts of 5G networks. For example, the recently started
EU 5G-PPP project SESAME (Small cEllS coordinAtion for Multi-tenancy and
Edge services) aims to provide solutions in the ﬁeld [16]. Another, EU 5G-PPP
project called 5G-ENSURE aims at deﬁning the security architecture and devel-
oping security enablers for 5G [17].
1.1 Contribution
In order to investigate the security challenges of 5G networks, one must look
into the security issues of its elements and their interaction. In this paper, we
identify the security threats and vulnerabilities of SCaaS, NFV, and MEC, as a
ﬁrst step towards a more comprehensive 5G security analysis that we intend to
undertake in future work. Our analysis is focused on SC infrastructure, whose
security is a very crucial issue because SCs are expected to support both MNOs
and end-users, who cannot tolerate ﬁnancial losses or data privacy violations,
and therefore they seek the highest possible security guarantees. Having a com-
prehensive view and taxonomy of security threats and vulnerabilities in SCs, is
prerequisite for architecting optimal security solutions.
1.2 State-of-the-art
The state-of-the-art within the ﬁeld of 5G security is in its infancy. Mantas
et al. [18] investigated some of the potential threats and attacks against the
main components of 5G systems. The authors mainly focus on security issues
related to the user equipment, and although they brieﬂy go beyond that, they
do not present security issues that open up as a result of SCaaS, NFV, and
MEC. Apart from this, they lack a clear list of criteria that facilitate the creation
of a taxonomy of threats and vulnerabilities. In an even less depth, in terms of
threats and vulnerabilities investigation, Fang et al. [19] propose a high level
security framework for 5G networks, without paying particular attention in the
technologies we consider in our paper, here.
Within the realm of physical layer security for 5G networks, Yang et al. [20]
investigate the security challenges that open up when considering the technolo-
gies of heterogeneous networks, massive multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO),
and millimeter wave, which are likely to be important parts of 5G networks. Fur-
thermore, Duan and Wang [21] investigated the security challenges, focusing
mainly on authentication handover and privacy protection in 5G. The contribu-
tion of these papers is not directly comparable to ours, here, and we only referred
to them for completeness.
1.3 Outline
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we describe a generic, high-level
architecture for SCaaS. We also present our assumptions regarding the SCaaS
security and the adversarial model. Section 3 discusses the security challenges
of SCaaS and reveals major security threats that arise due to (i) network re-
sources and functions being virtualized, (ii) the adoption of MEC, and (iii) the
incorporation of NFV and SDN concepts. We also present a set of criteria to
facilitate the taxonomy of security challenges and discuss their mutual depen-
dencies. Finally, Section 4 concludes this paper by summarizing its contributions
and presenting our plans for future work.
2 Prerequisites
2.1 System Architecture
Our considered high-level system architecture for SCaaS is in line with [22] and
has been illustrated in Fig. 1. The main elements of this architecture include:
infrastructure virtualization; NFV; SDN, and MEC. According to the SC in-
frastructure virtualization principle, the physical SC is sliced into a number of
virtual SCs (VSCs). To enable MEC services, each VSC is equipped with a MEC
server, which has the ability to communicate with the Cloud and to execute some
of the functions that are traditionally hosted in the Cloud. Furthermore, mul-
tiple MEC servers can be clustered to provide enhanced services in the form of
a light data centre (Light DC) and managed by the virtual resources manager
Fig. 1. High-level system architecture for Small Cell as a Service.
(VRM). Each VSC also accommodates a number of virtual network functions
(VNFs) and it is managed by the SCaaS Orchestrator via an SDN agent. Above
the management layer there is the service layer, in which multiple tenants (i.e.,
MNOs) are accommodated.
The network service layer accommodates MNOs who are beneﬁted from
having on-demand access to SC resources without owing the physical infrastruc-
ture. MNOs communicate with the SCaaS Orchestrator, located in the manage-
ment layer, who orchestrates the allocation of virtual resources to MNOs. The
SCaaS Orchestrator closely collaborates with the VRM, which is responsible
for the management of virtual resources of MEC servers in the physical infras-
tructure layer. The control of VSCs is performed via SDN agents using some
appropriate SDN protocol, such as the MobileFlow [23]. Finally, various net-
work functions, such as ﬁrewalling and deep packet inspection (DPI), are virtu-
alized using the NFV technology and managed by the VNF Manager. A speciﬁc
realization of the architecture of Fig. 1 could be, for example, the SESAME ar-
chitecture [16], [24]. However, in this work we intentionally keep our considered
system architecture as generic as possible in order to accommodate a wide range
of implementation choices of the SCaaS concept.
2.2 Security Assumptions
To identify the security challenges of the investigated system architecture, we
ﬁrst introduce our security assumptions, regarding the baseline security of the
system. One of main assumptions is the physical security of SC infrastructure
and hardware integrity. More speciﬁcally, we assume that hardware tampering
is prevented by appropriate security controls deployed by the SC infrastructure
owner [25], and that the Cloud provider has ensured the physical security of the
Cloud infrastructure and of the data centres (e.g., according to the recommen-
dations from the Cloud Security Alliance [26]). The existence of physical attacks
will be considered in our future works. Note that due to space limitations, in this
paper, we do not consider attacks that are initiated from the Cloud side. In-
stead, we focus on attacks originated either from user equipment (UE) or from
the SC infrastructure itself (e.g., from a malicious tenant or a compromised sys-
tem component). Besides, modern literature has investigated Cloud-originated
attacks and identiﬁed the main Cloud security challenges [27,28]; developed ade-
quate security solutions [29]; and proposed methods for Cloud provider selection
based on security and privacy requirements [30].
2.3 Adversarial Model
Our analysis adopts the widely-used Dolev-Yao adversarial model [31]. According
to this model, the cellular network is represented as a set of abstract entities that
exchange messages and the adversary is capable of overhearing, intercepting,
and synthesizing any message and they are only limited by the constraints of
the deployed cryptographic methods. For example, the adversary neither is able
to forge the message authentication code (MAC) nor has the means to obtain
the plaintext of encrypted messages.
Apart from the above, we enrich the adversarial model by considering com-
promised nodes. The adversary per se could be a legitimate tenant interacting
with network entities by using valid credentials and having privileged access to
virtualized resources. Yet the adversary might run any management application
in their VSC or specify various policies within its virtual domain, which is deﬁned
as a cluster of VSCs allocated to the same tenant.
3 Security Challenges
In this section we discuss the security challenges that emerge from the adoption
of the SCaaS concept, using as a reference the architecture of Fig. 1. We adopt
the widely-used threat taxonomy proposed in [32] and identify the security chal-
lenges that arise due to speciﬁc architectural characteristics and interaction of
various components and layers of SCaaS. The diﬀerent security challenges can
be classiﬁed according to ﬁve categories.
 Precondition: What are the necessary conditions to be met before the
adversary is able to launch the attack? For example, if the attack requires
a particular service running on the victim side, the existence of an open
interface is a precondition; another case is when the adversary has some
particular access rights.
 Vulnerability: What are the vulnerabilities of the system components or
the network interfaces, which can be exploited by the adversary? For ex-
ample, some components could be implemented in software with ﬂaws or
non-adequate cryptographic mechanisms could be in place [33].
 Target: Which components or interfaces are the potential attack targets?
Other considerations include the communication layer the adversary targets
and whether he aims to compromise the control or the data plane or both.
 Method: What are the various attack methods, tools and techniques that
the adversary might use? In the same category we examine whether the
adversary follows an active (e.g., replay attack) or passive strategy (e.g.,
passive reconnaissance).
 Eﬀect: What is the impact of a successful attack on the victimized system
component or network interface? Impact might be, for instance, unavailabil-
ity of some services, ﬁnancial costs, and leakage of sensitive data.
Below, we identify speciﬁc security challenges for each of the aforementioned
ﬁve categories.
3.1 Precondition
Regarding precondition, the following types of requirements might be valid for
the adversary.
Speciﬁc conﬁguration: In some cases, to launch an attack against a compo-
nent, the adversary requires that this component has speciﬁc exploitable con-
ﬁguration or runs a speciﬁc software. For example, a precondition for a denial-
of-service (DoS) attack [34, 35] can be speciﬁc conﬁguration of the VRM with
regard to the allocation of resources to tenants. Yet, some ﬂaws in the resource
allocation algorithm can allow the adversary to prevent a tenant from accessing
its portion of virtual resources. Also, other types of DoS attacks may exploit the
broadband nature of the wireless medium. For example, malicious interference at
the physical layer, even using oﬀ-the-shelf hardware, can cause packet collisions
at the media access control (MAC) layer [36].
Ubiquitous connectivity : If a network component or function can be accessed
via the public Internet, this may be exploited by a remote adversary. The ad-
versary will require a way of discovering the vulnerable component and sending
messages via control or data plane. By moving the network intelligence to the
network edge, as with the Light DC, a pool of MEC servers is usually available
for UEs to be connected via the Internet using conventional methods. Also, the
physical location and distributed or centralised nature of the SCaaS Orchestrator
could be an important factor inﬂuencing its security. For example, one way to
realise the SCaaS Orchestrator is as a distributed function with its instances
located across multiple SCs (e.g., in the form of a VNF). In such case, if pub-
lic Internet is used to remotely conﬁgure various SCaaS policies, this can be
exploited by the adversary.
Privileged access: The adversary has privileged access to some parts of the
network components or functions. The privileged access can be either at the
administrator level or at the user level. For example, the adversary may be a
legitimate UE receiving service from its MNO, with the latter being a legiti-
mate tenant of the SC network infrastructure. Also, the emerging bring your
own device (BYOD) trend in modern enterprises, constitutes many conventional
security solutions incapable of protecting the private network [37]. For example,
a Trojan horse that infected an employee's device, can bypass the security of the
corporate ﬁrewall.
3.2 Vulnerabilitiy
SDN controller weaknesses: Some vulnerabilities are caused by ﬂaws in software
and programming errors. This may lead, for example, to control ﬂow attacks
[38] and buﬀer overﬂow attacks [39]. This issue is particularly important in the
context of next-generation wireless networks, where the trend is to implement
the control plane in software and to virtualize network functions [40,41]
Flaws of NFV platforms: The virtualised environment itself could introduce
many potential security problems [42]. In particular, ﬂaws of the virtualisation
platform in place, may constitute the guest operating system (OS) vulnerable to
side-channel attacks. For example, weak isolation between host and guest OSs
may lead to a side-channel attack based on cache leakage [43].
Cloud based management : Some vulnerabilities stem from the Cloud based
management nature of certain network components. The Cloud based interface
used for conﬁguration and updates could be used as a potential attack channel.
Weak access control and authentication: Use of weak or default passwords
could be easily exploited by an adversary and should be avoided. Also, some
components may have hard-coded passwords, which can be exploited by the
adversary towards the establishment of backdoor access; stealthy or not.
Weak cryptographic mechanisms: Weaknesses or improper use of crypto-
graphic mechanisms may lead to security breaches in authentication processes
and data conﬁdentiality. Also, the generation of cryptographic keys shouldn't
rely on weak random number generators. Other security problems may arise due
to communication protocols that use weak cryptographic primitives. Hence, it
should be ensured that the cryptographic security controls are in place [44]. This
is to say that any adopted public-key scheme that enables the encryption of the
communications among SC, UE, and the Cloud, should be suﬃciently secure.
3.3 Target
Physical small cell infrastructure: Attacks on the speciﬁc piece of hardware that
is used in the cellular network [45]. For example the physical SC infrastructure
can be a target of hardware attacks. While it is a common practice for the users
to authenticate themselves to mobile devices before using them, the devices
usually do not do the same to users. This means that there is a risk for the
authentication secret to be revealed to a non-authenticated device. Hence, an
attacker may try to obtain the secret, by replacing the device with a malicious
one [46].
NFV-based management system: Some attacks initiated inside virtualised
environments may aim at taking control of the Hypervisor [47]. Also, the SCaaS
Orchestrator is an attractive attack target due to being in the 'middle of the
system model architecture, as well as other components of themanagement layer,
such as the VNF Manager. Finally, impersonation by the adversary of one of the
VNFs or the MEC server when communicating with the management layer could
be a potential threat.
VM-hosted operating system: Both host and guest OS may be targeted [48],
and to alleviate the impact of such an attack, adequate isolation must be enforced
between guest virtual machines (VMs), as well as between the host and guest
VMs. The adversary could attempt to break the isolation by exploiting, e.g.,
some ﬂaws of the virtualisation platform in use [49].
Mobility management entity : In some cases, the attack does not target a
speciﬁc layer in the system architecture, but it rather aims to take control of a
speciﬁc network entity, either physical or virtual, such as the mobility manage-
ment entity (MME). Protecting against such kind of attacks will be even more
diﬃcult when a distributed MME is introduced in 5G networks [50].
MEC-based application: A certain application that runs, for instance, on a
MEC server is a potential attack target. This does not aﬀect only the SC that
hosts the compromised MEC server. Due to clustering of MEC servers into the
Light DC, as discussed in Section 2, and their communication with the Cloud, a
compromised MEC server can be used as a door to attack other network entities
and components. Also, the adversary may attempt to attack the network service
isolation. This may result in the violations of limits for virtual resources or
unauthorized use of other tenants' resources. We assume that the adversary can
attempt to impersonate another tenant or another network entity. Also, it may
attempt to decrypt the intercepted messages.
MobileFlow protocol : A usual attack target is the protocol used for com-
munication, management or control purposes, such as the MobileFlow proto-
col [23]. For example, the southbound and northbound interfaces, shown in Fig.
1, are potential attack targets when attempting to hijack the communication of
the SCaaS Orchestrator with VSCs and MNOs. Also, the communication within
the SC infrastructure could be targeted; for example, between the management
and the physical infrastructure layer. This may enable an adversary to alter the
network policies and create attack channels. In particular, possible attack tar-
gets are (i) communication of the VNF Manager with VNFs in a SC; and (ii)
communication of the VRM with MEC servers. Hence, the adversary may try to
alter or disable legitimate policies and cause attacks such as DoS and privilege
escalation or to violate the privacy of other tenants data.
3.4 Method
Reverse engineering : The adversary collects and analyses sensitive information
about the network and its functionality. She may also try to decompile the soft-
Fig. 2. Dependencies among security challenges of Small Cell as a Service in virtualised
MEC environments.
ware to retrieve the source code. This may enable the adversary to identify
vulnerabilities in the software or network interfaces. In some cases, the adver-
sary may exploit weaknesses in the implemented access control mechanisms and
exploit a device through normal usage, i.e., as a legitimate user. Other reverse-
engineering techniques may target users' sensitive personal information. For ex-
ample, the increasing popularity of mobile crowdsourcing and mobile sensing
projects [51] may enable an attacker to exploit various personal data such as the
user location, mobility patterns or web browsing habits [52].
SDN controller hijacking : By exploiting the SDN controller implementation
weaknesses, the adversary tries to divert the control ﬂows to a controlled device
[53]. Then the captured messages can be discarded preventing the data plane
entities from proper operation. In a more advanced case, the captured messages
may be manipulated with a special purpose code and sent into the network.
VNF/VM infection: The adversary infects a virtual network component, such
as a VM or a VNF, with a malicious code. In this way, an unwanted and poten-
tially harmful functionality can be added to the aﬀected system and can modify
its behaviour. The future trends in network softwarization and programmabil-
ity [54, 55] make this attack method particularly important. Furthermore, in a
typical virtualised environment, guest VMs are expected to run in complete iso-
lation. This means that a VM is not able to interact with the host and other
VMs nor is able to monitor or control them in any way. This isolation is typically
enforced by the Hypervisor. However, such virtualised environments may be vul-
nerable to the so-called VM escape attack [56], which is a process of breaking out
the aforementioned VM isolation. This can be achieved for example by installing
malware on the Hypervisor [57].
Crafted packets and data: The adversary can attack communication and con-
trol protocols by injecting crafted packets or crafted input data. These actions
may exploit, for example, the parsing vulnerabilities of protocol implementa-
tions [58].
Replay attack : The adversary captures packets or packet fragments and re-
plays them at appropriate times aiming to cause protocol failures or other types
of disruption and confusion.
Eavesdropping : The adversary observes messages exchanged between vari-
ous network components or functions. In this way, sensitive information can
be obtained, especially if this information is weakly protected by cryptographic
mechanisms or not protected at all.
3.5 Eﬀect
VM/VNF privilege escalation: The adversary, who has already some level of
limited access privilege (e.g., to a VM or a VNF), manages to gain more privilege.
This may have very serious negative eﬀects for SDN-based mobile networks [59]
as well as for the emerging Internet of things (IoT) technologies [60].
Denial of service: A potential outcome of attacks can be DoS leading to
switched oﬀ or malfunctioning SC, or unavailable MEC servers. Also, a DoS
attack against the SCaaS Orchestrator can cause service disruption and data
loss. Yet, in a multi-tenant environment, security implications that may arise
due weak isolation between tenants may allow adversaries to compromise more
than one tenants upon compromising one of the other tenants. Furthermore, a
DoS attack may be launched from within the SC [11].
Tenant data integrity violation: Some data or code, including various con-
ﬁguration settings and security policies, can be altered. This is a particularly
important issue in a virtualised multi-tenant environment. It must be taken into
account that some tenants could be malicious. Hence, adequate data isolation
for diﬀerent tenants must be ensured. This could be done, for example at the
database level or at the hardware level.
Tenant conﬁdentiality violation: In some cases sensitive information of a ten-
ant may be leaked and made available to the adversary or to a malicious tenant.
Degraded level of SCaaS protection: A possible eﬀect can be the degradation
of SCaaS infrastructure protection. This can be achieved, for example, by altering
the security policies or switching to weaker cryptographic mechanisms.
Illegitimate access to SC/MEC resources: The adversary gains illegitimate
access to the SC resources (physical or virtual) or MEC environment. Given
the increasing trend of outsourcing data and applications, an adequate security
solution must ensure that only authorised entities gain access. Also, the insider
threat should be considered and appropriate mechanisms must be put in place
for preventing service providers form misusing tenants' data.
In Fig. 2, we show, in the form of a directed graph, an example of possible
dependencies of these categories. For instance, to cause DoS, the adversary could
select VM/VNF infection as an attack method. To achieve that, malware could
be injected in the management system (e.g., to the VRM or the VNF Manager
in Fig. 1), a VM-hosted OS, or a MEC-based application (i.e., by compromising
a MEC server), which constitute the potential attack targets. To target, e.g.,
the VM-hosted OS, the adversary could possibly exploit the SDN controller
weaknesses or ﬂaws of NFV platforms, and take advantage of any privileged
access rights.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we have identiﬁed the most important security challenges of SCaaS
in virtualized environments of 5G networks. We envision that novel technologies,
such as NFV, SDN, and MEC will be adopted in the future and will play an
important role in the SCaaS realization. We have summarized the main secu-
rity challenges that (i) open up with these technologies and (ii) arise due to
the interoperability among them, which enables SCaaS. We have highlighted
the necessary conditions for the adversary to be able to launch an attack; the
vulnerabilities of various system components and network interfaces that can be
exploited by the adversary; potential targets of attacks, such as management
systems and applications; various methods and techniques that can be used by
the adversary; and ﬁnally, the impact of the attacks on an SCaaS provider and
its tenants. In future work, we intend to study and evaluate prominent security
solutions developed for protecting virtualized SC networks and systems per se,
focusing on NFV, SDN, and MEC. This security assessment will use this paper,
here, as a basis.
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